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Abstract
We define a Causal Decision Problem as a Decision Problem
where the available actions, the family of uncertain events
and the set of outcomes are related through the variables of
a Causal Graphical Model G. A solution criteria based on
Pearl’s Do-Calculus and the Expected Utility criteria for ra-
tional preferences is proposed. The implementation of this
criteria leads to an on-line decision making procedure that has
been shown to have similar performance to classic Reinforce-
ment Learning algorithms while allowing for a causal model
of an environment to be learned. Thus, we aim to provide the
theoretical guarantees of the usefulness and optimality of a
decision making procedure based on causal information.
Introduction
Decision making under uncertainty is a fundamental part of
intelligent reasoning (Lake et al. 2017) and many real-world
applications rely on decisions made by an autonomous
agent, such as self-driving cars. Current decision making
methods rely on associative methods, which find only statis-
tical patterns in data. On the contrary, causal knowledge al-
lows both for planning and counterfactual reasoning as well
as interpretability and explainability (Spirtes, Glymour, and
Scheines 2000), (Woodward 2005), (Pearl and Mackenzie
2018).We propose in this work a way of considering causal
information for decision making under uncertainty with ra-
tional preferences in such a way that optimal actions are cho-
sen according to the principle of Maximum Expected Utility,
which is the formal criteria for making choices under uncer-
tain conditions if rationality is assumed (Bernardo 2000).
Rationality and Expected Utility
Rationality in a Decision Making setting is defined axiomat-
ically in a way that the preferences of a decision maker
are logically consistent. If rational preferences are assumed,
then it is known that the coherent criteria for making choices
is the maximization of expected utility, either with respect
to a known utility function and probability distribution or a
pair of subjective objects (Bernardo 2000), (Gilboa 2009).
Rational decision making has been the standard theory in
economics both as a normative and a descriptive theory of
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human behavior and it has been the subject of multiple de-
bates (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), (Kahneman, Slovic,
and Tversky 1982). In this work we pretend to take a nor-
mative view for a rational decision maker who faces an un-
certain environment which is controlled by some unknown
causal mechanism.
Optimal Policies
Given a Reinforcement Learning Problem defined over a
Markov Decision Process, a policy is a function from the
space of states to the space of actions which is interpreted
as what should an agent do in a given state (Sutton and Barto
1998). An optimal policy is a policy which is optimal in the
sense of achieiving the maximum possible expected reward.
Optimal policies can be characterized by the Bellman equa-
tions (Puterman 2005), from where it can be shown to bee-
quivalent to finding the optimal action in the sense of the
maximum expected utility (Webb 2007).
Related Work
Human use and learning of Causal Relations has been exten-
sively studied by Cognitive Scientists. In particular, (Hag-
mayer and Sloman 2009), (Wellen and Danks 2012) (Hag-
mayer and Meder 2013) show that human beings conceive
their actions in their environment as interventions over it
and they are able to learn, use, and modify previous causal
knowledge during a sequential decision process.
From the Machine Learning point of view, (Lattimore,
Lattimore, and Reid 2016) consider a bandit problem where
the actions available to an autonomous agent are interven-
tions over a known causal model. In their work it is required
that the causal model is known, an assumption later relaxed
by (Sen et al. 2017) who considers as unknown only a part
of the causal model.
Our formulation of a Causal Decision Problem attempts
to give a framework for an agent to learn optimal actions
where a causal model controls his environment and the agent
is aware of this.
Causal Decision Problems
We define a Causal Decision Problem under Uncertainty
(CDPU) as a tuple (A, E , C,G,) where (A, E , C,) is
a classical Decision Problem under Uncertainty (Bernardo
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2000) and G is a Causal Graphical Model (Sucar 2015) such
that the set of available actions A and the set of outcomes C
are related through the variables of the Causal Model G; i.e.,
the events in the family E correspond to variables in G. It is
assumed that the agent does not know the Causal Model G,
which is equivalent to not knowing the probabilities of the
events E ∈ E . The model G is also assumed to remain fixed
and to be invariant under interventions (Woodward 2005)
and to satisfy the conditions expressed in (Spirtes, Glymour,
and Scheines 2000). The variable in G which encodes the
consequence of the action taken by the agent will be re-
ferred as target variable since it is the variable where the
agent whishes to obtain a desired result.
In this way, in a CDPU we have a rational agent who
chooses an action a among the many available in A, then
this action will produce some random effect in the environ-
ment which will cause a certain consequence, or outcome
c ∈ C. Since
Proposed Solution
Since rationality is assumed we must seek to maximize the
expected utility of the agent in terms of his current knowl-
edge, which is expressed as a (subjective) probability dis-
tribution. Using the awareness of the agent about a causal
mechanism governing the environment, intuition encourages
to use causal relations to cause some desirable action, as ex-
pressed by (Joyce 1999)
Consider a Causal Decision Problem as stated above
where the target variable, call it Y , takes its values in the
set {0, 1} and without loss of generality assume that 1 is the
desired output for the agent, then he must choose the action
a∗ ∈ A such that
P (Y = 1|do(a∗)) ≥ P (Y = 1|do(a)) for all a ∈ A.
Since the action chosen is the action with the highest proba-
bility of producing the most desired action, then it is the ac-
tion that maximizes the expected utility for the agent. If an
action a0 ∈ A yielded a higher expected utility, that would
imply that it has higher probability of causing the same de-
sired action, but this is not possible because of how a∗ is
obtained.
On-line decision making and causal learning
In (Gonzalez-Soto, Sucar, and Escalante 2018) a decision-
making procedure was proposed using the Proposed Solu-
tion together with Bayesian belief updating procedure in or-
der to learn an optimal action while acquiring a causal model
in the environment and using the current causal knowledge
to make choices, this was applied in the simpler case where
the decision maker knows the structure of the model G. In
the referred work, a decision maker held beliefs about the
causal information of the environment, which were encoded
into probability distributions. Those beliefs were used as if
they were the true model governing the environment in order
to choose an action according to the Solution proposed here.
Beliefs were updated in a Bayesian way after observing the
causally produced outcome, or consequence, of the action
chosen by the agent.
The actions learned after a series of decision rounds ob-
tained similar performance (in terms of average reward) as
an agent learning using the classical Q-Learning procedure.
Experimentally, this shows that causal information allows
an agent to learn an optimal action, in the sense of expected
utility, as well as learning a causal model of the environment.
Experiments
In (Gonzalez-Soto, Sucar, and Escalante 2018) a test sce-
nario about a medict trying to learn an optimal treatment for
a sick patient was used in order to show how causal informa-
tion could effectively guide a decision making process while
also allowing for learning of a causal model.
We reproduce here the results obtained in (Gonzalez-Soto,
Sucar, and Escalante 2018), which show the average reward
of a causal agent, where the agent knows the structure of
the graphical model and helds beliefs about the parameters
of the true causal model. The beliefs of the causal agent are
used in each decision round as if they were the truth about
the causal relations and used as stated above. Comparison
against an agent simply choosing at random is also shown.
In Figure 1 we observe the average reward obtained by
the three agents in 100 rounds, where our algorithm slightly
outperforms Q-Learning.
Figure 1: Average reward obtained in each round for each
agent
In Figure 2 we observe the average reward obtained by
the three agents in 200 rounds. The average reward obtained
is very similar for Q-learning and our algorithm.
Future Work
Numerical results show that the trayectories of the average
rewards both from our Causal Agent and the Q-agent seem
to stay together after some number of rounds, while leav-
ing behind the random-agent. In order to get a valid form
of concurrent validation it is required that this behavior will
remain like that from a certain point.
We thus state a conjecture which is yet to be proven:
Figure 2: Average reward obtained in each round for each
agent
Conjecture 1. Let (X1, X2, ...) ∈ R∞ the rewards obtained
by a decision-making procedure which is known to converge
to the max expected utility (or an optimal policy), then, if
(Y1, Y2, ...) ∈ R∞ are the rewards obtained by a decision-
making procedure that uses causal information in the way
we propose, then for all ε > 0 there exists an Nε ∈ N such
that |Xt − Yt| < ε for any t > Nε.
Conclusions
We have proposed an optimality criterion for decision mak-
ing under uncertainty when the environment where the agent
is situated is governed by an unknown causal mechanism.
This criteria, when used to build a decision making pro-
cedure yields similar performance as classical algorithms
which aim towards the same objective: maximizing expected
utility, thus showing that causal information, and causal-
based decision making is at least as useful as associative-
based case, while it also allows to learn a causal model of
the environment. The experiments shown serve as a form of
concurrent validation, where our proposed method is com-
pared to a decision-making method that it is known to learn
optimal policies (i.e., maximize expected utility)
Learning a causal model is useful because of the inter-
pretability and explainability that it provides when analyz-
ing why a particular decision was made. For the hypothetical
scenario used in the experiments, the causal model allows
for further inquiries about the choices made by the medic.
As (Pearl and Mackenzie 2018) mention, the three levels
of causal learning are observing, intervening and counter-
factual reasoning. Our proposed decision-making method
based on the solution stated above allows for each of the
three levels to be used. First of all, it allows to observe (and
learn) of effects of interventions. In second place, it allow to
intervene, and in third place to have the ability of explaining
why a particular choice was made in terms of the effects it
would produce given a certain level of causal knowledge.
It is left as future work to provide a decision making pro-
cedure when the causal model is completely unknown for
the agent and to provide theoretical convergence results both
to the true causal model and the optimal action.
References
Bernardo, J. 2000. Bayesian theory. Wiley Series in Proba-
bility and Statistics.
Gilboa, I. 2009. Theory of Decision under Uncertainty.
Cambridge University Press.
Gonzalez-Soto, M.; Sucar, L. E.; and Escalante, H. J. 2018.
Playing against nature: causal discovery for decision making
under uncertainty. arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.01268.
Hagmayer, Y., and Meder, B. 2013. Repeated causal deci-
sion making. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learn-
ing, Memory, and Cognition 39(1):33.
Hagmayer, Y., and Sloman, S. A. 2009. Decision makers
conceive of their choices as interventions. Journal of Exper-
imental Psychology: General 138(1):22.
Joyce, J. M. 1999. The Foundations of Causal Decision
Theory. Cambridge University Press.
Kahneman, D.; Slovic, P.; and Tversky, A. 1982. Judgment
under uncertainty. Technical report, Cambridge University
Press.
Lake, B. M.; Ullman, T. D.; Tenenbaum, J. B.; and Gersh-
man, S. J. 2017. Building machines that learn and think like
people. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 40.
Lattimore, F.; Lattimore, T.; and Reid, M. D. 2016. Causal
bandits: Learning good interventions via causal inference.
In Lee, D. D.; Sugiyama, M.; Luxburg, U. V.; Guyon, I.; and
Garnett, R., eds., Advances in Neural Information Process-
ing Systems 29. Curran Associates, Inc. 1181–1189.
Pearl, J., and Mackenzie, D. 2018. The Book of Why: The
New Science of Cause and Effect. Basic Books.
Puterman, M. L. 2005. Markov decision processes: Discrete
stochastic dynamic programming (wiley series in probabil-
ity and statistics).
Sen, R.; Shanmugam, K.; Dimakis, A. G.; and Shakkottai,
S. 2017. Identifying best interventions through online im-
portance sampling. In International Conference on Machine
Learning, 3057–3066.
Spirtes, P.; Glymour, C. N.; and Scheines, R. 2000. Causa-
tion, prediction, and search. MIT press.
Sucar, L. E. 2015. Probabilistic graphical models. Ad-
vances in Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. Lon-
don: Springer London. doi 10:978–1.
Sutton, R. S., and Barto, A. G. 1998. Reinforcement learn-
ing: An introduction. MIT Press.
Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. 1974. Judgment under un-
certainty: Heuristics and biases. science 185(4157):1124–
1131.
Webb, J. N. 2007. Game theory: Decisions, Interaction and
Evolution. Springer Undergraduate Mathematics Series.
Wellen, S., and Danks, D. 2012. Learning causal structure
through local prediction-error learning. In Proceedings of
the Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, vol-
ume 34.
Woodward, J. 2005. Making things happen: A theory of
causal explanation. Oxford University Press.
